A famous trademark in Greece is protected not only for the goods and services for which it is registered but even for dissimilar goods or services and even when a similar later trademark does not cause likelihood of confusion (articles 4.1.c and 26.1 of Trademark Act No. 2239/1994). The reason for the broad protection is to prevent the depreciation of its strong distinctive character and the unjust enrichment of a third party by the use of the famous trademark.

Briefly referring to the two landmark decisions recently issued in Canada by the Supreme Court (Mattel Inc v 3894207 Canada Inc 1006 SCC 22 and Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v Boutiques Cliquot Ltee 2006 SCC 23) it is noted that in these decisions it was pointed out that fame alone does not create a likelihood of confusion and although famous marks are generally entitled to a broader scope of protection, the likelihood of confusion was examined as well as the similarity of the parties' goods. As a consequence, the defendant's BARBIE'S restaurant and catering services were found not to cause confusion with the indeed famous Mattel mark BARBIE for dolls and accessories.

Most probably, a similar court decision would be virtually impossible in Greece. In a plethora of Greek court decisions and recently repeated in a decision rendered by the First Instance Court of Athens in 2006 (Dec. No. 1225/2006 Commercial Law Review 2006, pg. 466 ), a famous trademark is protected independently from the existence or not of likelihood of confusion. It is protected against the danger of 'weakening' of the mark and undue similarity. The test is not one with regard to the likelihood of confusion but one with regard to whether there exists an imitation or similarity of the sign with the famous mark and use of the sign for dissimilar goods and services, where the use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trademark (as also stated in the Council Directive 89/104).

The broader scope of protection of the famous mark is justified by its "intense distinctive character or its fame". The use of such a mark constitutes an infringement either because its use by a third party weakens its distinctive character or because it constitutes 'parasitic competition', i.e. competitive survival of the third party due to the use of the famous mark, conferring therefore undue gain (with no consideration) to the infringer Th. Liakopoulos, Industrial Property II, 1995 & N. Rokas, Trademark Law, 1978 .

In general under Greek law theory and case law, the requirements Th. Liakopoulos, Industrial Property II, 1995 that have to combine for a trademark to be characterized as "famous trademark" are the following, (although on occasion the court may not base its decision on all of these requirements or only on part of these or take into account other factors as well):

• The particularly good position of the trademark in the marketplace, i.e. the ascertainment that the trademark has been established with a major part of the consumer audience (the so-called high degree of recognition).
  
  
• The uniqueness of the indication, i.e. the ascertainment that there are no goods or services in the marketplace, even of irrelevant nature with the goods and services of the trademark in question, using the indication. In a notable decision of the First Instance Court of Athens in 1992 (Dec. No. 9077/1992 Commercial Law Review 1992, pg. 660, notes by A. Tsironis ), it was held that the trademark "APPLE" for computers did not bear the property of uniqueness, since the trademark "apple" had been previously registered for underwear.
  
  
• The originality of the trademark in question, i.e. a trademark cannot be characterized as 'famous trademark' if it consists of a 'weak' indication, namely an indication with a low level of distinctiveness. Examples of 'weak' indications are those whose prototype exists in nature. Based on this the Court of First Instance of Athens (Dec. No. 9077/1992) considered the trademark "APPLE" as 'weak' due to the device of the apple, since both the wording and the device had their prototype in nature.
  
  However, originality was not taken into consideration in several cases and it has been argued that it should not constitute one of the necessary prerequisites for a trademark to be characterized as famous. Examples of non-original trademarks are the trademark "PAVLIDES" which is a common Greek surname and is a famous trademark in Greece for chocolate products; the famous trademark "PAPADOPOULOU", again a very common Greek surname, registered for biscuit products. A notable example of a foreign trademark deemed as 'famous' in Greece is the known mark "501" for jeans Commercial Law Review 2000, pg. 372 notes by X. Xrysanthis .
  
  
• The positive appreciation by consumers of the goods and services distinguished by the trademark. Sometimes this can constitute the only critical factor taken into consideration by the Greek courts to establish that a trademark is indeed 'famous' and can be protected for all the goods and services. In 1981, the Court of First Instance of Athens prohibited the marketing of bicycles named BRAVO due to the existence of the famous Greek trademark BRAVO for coffee products. The trademark MERCEDES prevented the registration of the same for flowers.
  
  In a recently published decision, issued by the First Instance Court of Athens (Dec. No. 1225/2006) Commercial Law Review 2006, pg. 466 the court took into consideration as evidence of fame the following: the broad advertising of the goods bearing the trademark, the advertising expenditure for the promotion of the goods (approx. 700.000 Euro for 2001-2003), the sales in Greece during the period of 1989-2003 (approx. 34.000.000 Euro), the market share in Greece (1,4%), the recognizability of the goods (in this case the goods found to be 72% recognizable even with the wording of the trademark covered, according to a sworn testimony by the manager of a market research and survey agency).
  
  Finally, the court concluded that the mark constituted a 'famous mark' under Greek trademark law as it had been continuously used by the claimant for the distinction of its products throughout the international market and had been broadly advertised; its distinctive character was not impaired by being used by third parties on dissimilar products and services; there was a positive evaluation of the consuming audience with regard to the quality of the goods that the mark distinguished. Furthermore, the court held that the defendant took advantage of the good fame and management of the claimant, who had managed via the broad advertising and the quality of its products, to become well known in the international market, as well as in the Greek market and had acquired the trust of the consumers.
  
  The minor differences between the famous trademark and the later similar mark did not change the situation, as the court held that the more 'recognizable' a trademark is, the broader the scope of protection thereof and even less similarities are sufficient to prove its imitation.
  
  In addition, colouring and shape used by the well known company were found to enjoy autonomous protection, especially when they constitute a dominant characteristic of the whole packaging and are capable of attracting the attention of the consumer (similarly the triangle shape of Toblerone chocolate enjoys autonomous protection, First Instance Court of Athens, Decision No. 1478/2005).
  

In a different decision, (Conseil d'Etat, Dec. No. 726/2005 Commercial Law Review 2006, pg. 462 ) it was held by the Supreme Court that the registration of a trademark in multiple countries (28 different countries) and the large circulation of goods under the mark in the Greek and international marketplace (300.000.000 kgms of chocolate in the period of 1960-1980) were not sufficient in the particular case for the claimant's trademark to be characterized as 'famous'. The reason was because the Second Instance Court did not evaluate properly the evidence submitted and did not confirm the international fame of the claimant company and its prominent position in the international marketplace and Greece in particular. Nor did the Second Instance Court conclude whether these factors in combination with others resulted in the conclusion that the goods of the claimant enjoy a particularly good reputation among the consumers. The claimant contended that its goods had been in the Greek marketplace since 1977 and in the United States the mark was registered in 1923. The defendant argued that it ignored these products and on the contrary it had been marketing its own goods since 1974. Although the Second Instance Court accepted that the Greek company took advantage of the fame of the foreign company, the Supreme Court overturned the decision due to lack of complete justification of its decision.