Can Mass-Produced Useful Articles Be Copyrightable Works? Limits of Copyright Protection for Applied Art in the Supreme Court’s TRIPP TRAPP Decision

On 24 April 2026, the Supreme Court of Japan, in a case concerning a popular children’s chair brand (“TRIPP TRAPP”) articulated, for the first time, the Supreme Court’s standard for assessing whether applied art is copyrightable (Reiwa 7 (Ju) 356: in Japanese).

The Supreme Court held that the shape and other features of a mass-produced useful articles may be recognized as copyrightable only where they can be conceptually identified, apart from functionally dictated features, as creative expression.

Parties and Issue

The appellants in this case were Peter Opsvik AS, a Norwegian company that owns the copyright in the children’s chair brand “TRIPP TRAPP” (the “Chair”), and Stokke AS, also a Norwegian company, which manufactures and sells the Chair under an exclusive copyright license granted by Peter Opsvik AS. The appellee is Noz Co., Ltd., a Japanese furniture manufacturer.

The appellants alleged that the children’s chair manufactured and sold by the appellee infringed, among other rights, the reproduction right on the Chair, and sought an injunction against the manufacture and sale of appellee’s chair, along with damages.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Chair fell within the category of artistic works and thus qualified as a “work” under Article 2, paragraph 1, item 1 of the Copyright Act.

Previous Lower-Court Decisions

Japan’s Copyright Act contains no express provision concerning applied art.

In previous Japanese lower-court decisions, the standards for determining whether applied art qualifies as a copyrightable work had not been uniform. Even within the Intellectual Property High Court, different standards had been adopted depending on the panel, creating legal uncertainty. Broadly speaking, the lower-court decisions can be classified into the following three approaches.

The first approach recognizes copyrightability only where the applied art possesses a high degree of aesthetic expression comparable to pure fine art and can be regarded as an object of aesthetic appreciation.

The second approach recognizes copyrightability where, within the applied art, there is a portion that can be separated from the configuration necessary for its practical function and that independently constitutes an object of aesthetic appreciation. The appellate court in this case adopted this approach.

The third approach does not impose any special heightened requirement merely because the subject matter is applied art, and considers ordinary creative expression sufficient.　

The Standard Articulated by the Supreme Court and Its Reasons

First, the Supreme Court defined articles such as the Chair, which are mass-produced and intended for practical use in everyday life, as “mass-produced useful articles.” It then held that, with respect to such mass-produced useful articles, it could not adopt the view that the existence of ordinary creative expression alone immediately renders the article a copyrightable work. In other words, the Court rejected the third approach described above.

In support of this conclusion, the Supreme Court pointed to the differences between Japan’s Design Act and Copyright Act in terms of the requirements for acquiring rights, the content of those rights, and their duration.

Under the Design Act, design rights arise with respect to the shape and other features of mass-produced useful articles through the procedures of filing, examination, and registration. The right holder is granted an exclusive right to work the design as a business, and the term of protection is, in principle, 25 years from the filing date of the design registration application.

By contrast, under the Copyright Act, copyright arises without any procedure such as registration. Its scope extends beyond acts conducted in the course of business, and its term of protection is, in principle, from the time of creation of the work until 70 years after the author’s death. In addition to copyright, authors are also granted moral rights.

If broad protection under copyright law were recognized for the shape and other features of mass-produced useful articles in addition to protection under the Design Act, there is a risk that long-term and broad protection could be obtained under copyright law without undergoing the costs and procedures of design registration. This could undermine the significance of the Design Act.

Moreover, if copyright protection were broadly extended to the shape and other features of mass-produced useful articles, moral rights could complicate the relevant legal relationships and hinder the exploitation of such articles. In addition, even after the expiration of the design right, the shape and other features of the mass-produced useful article might remain unavailable for free use for a long period, thereby potentially obstructing the purpose of the Design Act, which is to contribute to the development of industry.

After explaining the above, the Supreme Court formulated the following standard for determining whether a mass-produced useful article qualifies as a copyrightable work:

When the shape or other features of a mass-produced useful article, in whole or in part, can conceptually be grasped, separately from configurations derived from function, as a creative expression of thoughts or emotions, the whole or part of that mass-produced useful article constitutes a “work” under Article 2, paragraph 1, item 1 of the Copyright Act.

The Court also gave examples of mass-produced useful articles that would satisfy this standard, such as articles to which decoration exceeding the level of mere surface patterns or surface treatment has been added, or articles that can be perceived as a sculpture or the like as a whole.

The Court then held that the shape and other features of the Chair, whether in whole or in part, were configurations derived from its function as a children’s chair and could not be grasped separately from those configurations as creative expression. Accordingly, the Chair did not qualify as a copyrightable work.

Reasons for Avoiding the Term “Aesthetic Appreciation”

A supplementary opinion by Justice Akira Ojima accompanied the judgment. The supplementary opinion explains why the Supreme Court deliberately refrained from using the term “aesthetic appreciation,” which had been used by the appellate court in this case.

Specifically, the term “aesthetic appreciation” may give rise to the misunderstanding that a high degree of creativity or artistry is required when determining the copyrightability of a mass-produced useful article. Moreover, it is inappropriate for a court to determine whether a mass-produced useful article is worthy of aesthetic appreciation as art. The supplementary opinion cited these concerns as reasons for avoiding that terminology.

Therefore, where the shape or other features of a mass-produced useful article can be grasped as creative expression that is not a configuration derived from function, copyrightability may be recognized even if the degree of such creative expression is not high.

The Supreme Court judgment in this case is significant in that it clarified the institutional division of roles between the Design Act and the Copyright Act in relation to applied art in Japan, by indicating that the copyrightability of applied art should not be left to subjective or aesthetic evaluation, but should instead be determined according to a more legal and structural standard: whether creative expression not derived from functional configuration can be conceptually grasped. It also confirmed that, where such expression can be identified, a high degree of creativity or artistry is not required.